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The 2013 IRS Crisis:
Where Do We Go From Here?
By Donald B. Tobin
The biggest political campaign controversy in
2013 did not involve political candidates but in-
stead centered on the IRS’s enforcement of Internal
Revenue Code provisions regulating the political
activities of some tax-exempt organizations. Some
tax-exempt groups and politicians argued that the
IRS improperly targeted conservative, politically
active tax-exempt organizations for scrutiny, while
others argued that the IRS had failed to enforce
restrictions in the IRC regulating the political activ-
ity of tax-exempt organizations.1 The IRS’s attempt
— and some say ineptitude — in enforcing the
code’s political campaign restrictions caused a po-
litical crisis that rocked America’s trust in the
nonpartisan enforcement of the tax laws. The
Obama administration needs to move quickly to
restore that trust while also restoring confidence
that independent groups will not be able to circum-
vent congressional intent regarding the disclosure
of donors to political organizations.
The underlying causes of the IRS crisis were both
external and internal. First, external factors placed
the IRS in the middle of regulating aspects of
political campaigns — a chore for which it is not
particularly well suited. The statutory regime vests
the IRS with the responsibility of ensuring that
tax-exempt organizations comply with restrictions
on their political campaign activities. It also gives
the IRS the responsibility of policing campaign-
related disclosure provisions that require section
527 political organizations to disclose contributors
and expenditures.
Second, internal factors within the IRS’s control
exacerbated the crisis. Despite a drastically chang-
ing regulatory landscape and significant changes to
the ways tax-exempt organizations engage in politi-
cal activity, the IRS failed to ramp up enforcement
or provide adequate guidance to tax-exempt groups
regarding permissible and impermissible activities.
When the IRS finally sought to engage in some
enforcement, it did so in a way that ignited the
crisis. Because most tax-exempt section 527 political
organizations must disclose the names of their
donors and the amount of their contributions, as
well as the organization’s expenditures, indepen-
dent groups have strong incentives to organize as
tax-exempt entities that are not subject to the dis-
closure provisions, most notably social welfare or-
ganizations and business leagues. The regulatory
structure is inadequate to deal with the growing
number of organizations seeking to avoid political
organization status and thereby avoid the code’s
disclosure provisions. As groups have become more
aggressive in seeking alternative entity status to
avoid disclosure provisions, the regulatory struc-
ture has not kept pace.
1See, e.g., letter to then-IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman
from Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. (July 27, 2012) (calling attention
to the IRS’s inactivity in enforcing the statutory requirement
that social welfare organizations not engage in political activity);
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This article argues that the IRS’s new proposed
regulation on candidate-related political activities
is a good first step. It creates a bright-line standard
that is easy to apply and will reduce concerns that
the IRS is manipulating the enforcement process for
political gain. The regulation addresses serious
concerns that some independent groups are circum-
venting disclosure laws in the code. These groups
are improperly arguing that they qualify as social
welfare organizations when in fact they are political
organizations subject to disclosure under section
527. A better solution would be for Congress to pass
broad-based campaign disclosure laws that would
apply regardless of the type of entity engaged in the
activity. Absent broad-based disclosure, the IRS has
the responsibility to enforce the restrictions con-
tained in the code. Under the proposed regulation,
organizations wishing to engage in candidate-
related political activities may still do so. They
simply must do so through a section 527 political
organization and disclose their contributions and
expenditures. However, absent broad-based disclo-
sure, groups will seek out other entity structures to
engage in non-disclosed candidate advocacy.
This article was presented on January 17 at a
symposium in Malibu, Calif., sponsored by Pepper-
dine University School of Law and Tax Analysts.
Twenty of the nation’s leading tax academics, prac-
titioners, and journalists gathered to discuss the
prospects for tax reform as it is affected by two
crises facing Washington: dangerously misaligned
spending and tax policies, resulting in a crippling
$17.4 trillion national debt; and the IRS’s alleged
targeting of conservative political organizations. A
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http://new.livestream.com/pepperdine
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The best step Congress and President Obama can
take to restore confidence in the IRS and reduce
damage from the crisis is to pass broad-based
campaign disclosure laws that remove the IRS from
the campaign finance landscape. The IRS is an
organization designed to protect the fisc and en-
force the internal revenue laws. It has no particular
expertise in campaign finance, and placing the IRS
in the middle of this fray can only lead to distrust in
the agency and accusations that the IRS’s decisions
are based on a political agenda.2
Absent new legislation providing for broad-
based disclosure, Treasury can engage in some
self-help activities. In November 2013 the adminis-
tration released a proposed regulation designed to
clarify the rules for tax-exempt social welfare orga-
nizations involved in political activity.3 The regula-
tion is a good first step. It creates a bright-line
standard that is easy to apply and will eliminate
much of the gray area regarding permissible politi-
cal activity. Clearer lines will decrease the IRS’s
discretion and, in turn, reduce the opportunity for
the IRS to be used as a political tool in an adminis-
tration’s toolbox.
In many instances, the proposed regulation does
not go far enough to clarify the rules for tax-exempt
organizations involved in political advocacy. Since
groups have a strong incentive to avoid organiza-
tional forms that require disclosure, regulatory clar-
ity will help prevent gaming by tax-exempt
organizations. Further, the proposed regulation
does not address a constant problem in this area:
the fact that entity-based regulation will encourage
the creation of new and different entities to get
around the current rules. Any final regulation
should be more broad-based and apply to all sec-
tion 501(c) organizations except churches and chari-
ties.
Second, the regulation does not do enough to
address the enforcement problems that surfaced as
part of the crisis. The administration should set out
clear guidance regarding when and how it will
enforce the current rules governing tax-exempt or-
ganizations. It appears the IRS failed to enforce
those rules in the past because it feared entering the
political fray, and there have been almost no court
cases involving the enforcement of political restric-
tions on tax-exempt organizations. The regulation
will have no effect if the IRS continues its practice of
failing to enforce the requirements.4
A. History and Current Regulatory Structure
The history of the statutory structure regulating
tax-exempt organizations indicates that Congress
intended that tax-exempt organizations that wished
to engage in significant political campaign advo-
cacy organize as section 527 political organizations
and disclose their donors and expenditures. The
proposed regulation is not a new attempt by the
administration to place further restrictions on tax-
exempt organizations but is instead an effort to
clarify the current rules and restore equilibrium to
the statutory structure. The attempt by organiza-
tions to circumvent congressional intent and use
other tax-exempt forms as a means of avoiding the
disclosure provisions for section 527 political orga-
nization violates the statutory structure, and the
administration is appropriately taking steps to stop
that abuse. The proposed regulation also provides
clearer standards, which give the IRS less discretion
regarding enforcement and which provide tax-
exempt groups more information about permissible
activities.
1. Structure of exempt organizations. In general,
almost all political campaign activity is conducted
by tax-exempt organizations. Although section
501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from inter-
vening in a political campaign, social welfare
groups organized under section 501(c)(4), labor
unions organized under section 501(c)(5), and busi-
ness leagues organized under section 501(c)(6) all
may engage in campaign-related political activities.
However, those organizations must be primarily
engaged in activities consistent with their exempt
function, and political campaign activities do not
count as activities consistent with their exempt
function.5
2In fact, even before this crisis, those assertions were made
by Democrats during the George W. Bush administration and by
Republicans during the Obama administration. See Michael
Janofsky, ‘‘Citing July Speech, I.R.S. Decides to Review
N.A.A.C.P.,’’ The New York Times, Oct. 29, 2004 (quoting NAACP
Chair Julian Bond: ‘‘This is an attempt to silence the N.A.A.C.P.
on the very eve of a presidential election. We are best known for
registering and turning out large numbers of African-American
voters. Clearly, someone in the I.R.S. doesn’t want that to
happen.’’); Rebecca Trounson, ‘‘IRS Ends Church Probe but Stirs
New Questions,’’ Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 2007 (quoting All
Saints Episcopal Church attorney Marcus S. Owens indicating
his client was concerned that ‘‘the IRS allowed partisan political
concerns to direct the course of the All Saints examination’’);
letter from Senate Finance Committee Republicans to Shulman
(May 18, 2011) (six senators urged the IRS to stop enforcing gift
tax on donations to groups active in politics).
3REG-134417-13.
4Although the crisis is the result of the IRS’s delay in
granting exempt status to organizations, there is little evidence
of significant enforcement actions by the IRS in this area. There
are almost no cases involving the revocation of exempt status
for engaging in political activity, and I am unaware of any
published cases involving the IRS reclassifying an organization
as a section 527 political organization.
5Reg. section 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
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Under the current regulatory structure, section
501(c)(3) churches and charities are entitled to re-
ceive contributions, which are deductible by the
donors. Also, in most cases the income of section
501(c)(3) organizations is not subject to tax. How-
ever, section 501(c)(3) organizations are completely
prohibited from engaging in campaign-related po-
litical activities.
Section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, the
organizations that are the subject of the proposed
regulation, must not be organized for profit and
must be ‘‘operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare.’’6 Although Congress used the word
‘‘exclusively’’ in the statute, a current regulation
provides that an organization qualifies if ‘‘it is
primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people of
the community.’’7 Intervention in a political cam-
paign is not a social welfare purpose.8 Thus, to the
extent groups seek to engage in significant
campaign-related activities, they do not qualify as
social welfare organizations under current law. Fur-
ther, unlike section 501(c)(3) organizations, social
welfare organizations are not required to file a form
with the IRS seeking recognition of their exempt
status. They may seek recognition by filing a Form
1024, but they are not required to do so.9 A social
welfare organization must file a Form 990 informa-
tion return; however, that return may not be due
(including extensions) for 22½ months from the
group’s creation.10
If anything, the statutory definition providing
that an organization must be exclusively engaged in
social welfare indicates congressional intent that
social welfare organizations not be political cam-
paign advocacy organizations. It is the Treasury
regulation, not the statute, that says a social welfare
organization may engage in some level of political
activity.
The code also provides for myriad other tax-
exempt organizations, including business leagues
and labor unions. Similar to social welfare groups,
these organizations may engage in political
campaign-related activities, but they must be pri-
marily engaged in an exempt activity — promoting
business or labor.11
In 1976 Congress recognized that there was no
organizational category for groups that wanted to
engage in political campaign advocacy. Before 1976,
the IRS simply treated those organizations as tax-
exempt, finding that the organizations had no in-
come within the classic meaning of income. This
informal tax exemption became unworkable, and
Congress enacted section 527. Under section 527, a
political organization is ‘‘operated primarily for the
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contribu-
tions or making expenditures’’ to influence the
‘‘selection, nomination, election, or appointment of
any individual to any Federal, State, or local public
office.’’12 Just like social welfare organizations, labor
unions, and business leagues, section 527 political
organizations are tax exempt, and contributions to
the organizations are not deductible by donors.
Thus, after 1976 the statutory structure was clear.
Organizations that eschewed campaign activity or-
ganized as either section 501(c)(3) churches or chari-
ties or under another code provision. Organizations
that wished to engage in a small amount of political
campaign activity that was not their primary pur-
pose organized as social welfare organizations, la-
bor unions, or business leagues. Organizations that
wished to engage in significant campaign-related
advocacy did so through section 527 political orga-
nizations. The tax treatment of each organization
was fairly similar, and the intended activity, not the
tax consequences, generally drove entity choice.
2. Intervention in a political campaign. Current
rules governing tax-exempt section 501(c) organiza-
tions (thus excluding section 527 political organiza-
tions) regulate permissible political campaign
activities by setting out whether and how much an
organization can intervene in a political campaign.
Section 501(c)(3) churches and charities are prohib-
ited from intervening in a political campaign. Other
section 501(c) organizations may engage in a lim-
ited amount of activities intervening in a political
campaign, but intervention activities are inconsis-
tent with the groups’ exempt status.13 Section 527
6These organizations are exempt from tax, but unlike section
501(c)(3) churches and charities, contributions to the organiza-
tions are not tax deductible.
7Reg. section 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii); see Rev. Rul. 2004-6,
2004-1 C.B. 328. Lobbying is considered a social welfare activity
as long as the lobbying is related to the organization’s exempt
purpose.
8Reg. section 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
9See reg. section 1.6033-1(e). Social welfare organizations can
be ‘‘nondeclaring’’ social welfare organizations. Even if an
organization does not file for recognition, it is required to file a
Form 990 information return.
10Form 990 must be filed by the 15th day of the fifth month
of the end of the tax year. The organization can also seek a
six-month extension. Thus, a social welfare organization may
choose not to file an information return for 22½ months after its
creation. See reg. section 1.6033-1(e).
11See GCM 34233 (Dec. 3, 1969).
12Reg. section 1.527-2(a).
13See section 501(c)(3) (prohibiting intervention in a political
campaign for or against a candidate); reg. section 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(ii) (determining that the promotion of social welfare does
not include intervention in a political campaign for or against a
candidate); section 527 (‘‘does not include direct or indirect
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uses slightly different language and addresses an
organization ‘‘influencing or attempting to influ-
ence’’ an election of an individual for public office.
With limited exceptions, the IRS has determined
that if an activity is prohibited as political interven-
tion under section 501(c)(3), it is political interven-
tion for purposes of determining the primary
purpose for other section 501(c) organizations. Also,
with few exceptions, the IRS has determined that if
an action is political intervention for purposes of
the section 501(c)(3) prohibition, it is election activ-
ity for purposes of determining whether an organi-
zation is a section 527 political organization.14 Thus,
if an activity is considered intervention in a political
campaign, a section 501(c)(3) church or charity may
not engage in that activity; a social welfare organi-
zation and other section 501(c) organizations may
engage in a limited amount of the activity; and a
section 527 political organization may rely on that
activity in proving satisfaction of its primary pur-
pose.
There is no bright-line definition of what consti-
tutes intervention in a political campaign, and the
IRS has explained that the determination is based
on all the facts and circumstances. The IRS has
indicated that key factors include whether the state-
ment (1) identifies candidates for public office; (2)
expresses approval or disapproval for a candidate’s
positions or actions; (3) is delivered close to the
election; (4) addresses an issue that has been raised
as an issue distinguishing candidates; (5) is part of
a series of communications on the same issue that
are independent of the timing of any election; and
(6) is made when the identification of a candidate is
related to a non-electoral event.15
Rev. Rul. 2007-41 says ‘‘a communication is par-
ticularly at risk of political campaign intervention
when it makes reference to candidates or voting in
a specific upcoming election.’’
B. Current Problems
Before 2000, the regulatory structure worked
reasonably well. There were some questions regard-
ing the definition of intervention in a political
campaign, but organizations could determine their
proper entity choice fairly easily. Organizations
wishing to be tax-exempt churches or charities
organized as section 501(c)(3) organizations and
avoided intervening in political campaigns. Orga-
nizations that wished to intervene in political cam-
paigns in some circumstances but that still had
another major tax-exempt mission organized as
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations or as
another organization under section 501(c). And
organizations that wished to primarily engage in
campaign-related activities organized as section 527
political organizations. Because donations to section
501(c)(3) organizations are tax deductible, organiza-
tions chose to organize as section 501(c)(3) organi-
zations whenever possible. If an organization could
not meet the requirements as a church or charity,
however, the tax treatment of the other tax-exempt
options was very similar. Because the tax treatment
among the different tax-exempt groups was similar,
there was little incentive to game the system. Orga-
nizations engaged in entity choice based on their
purpose, and there was significantly less manipu-
lation and gamesmanship regarding a tax-exempt
organization’s underlying purpose.
This all changed in 2000 when Congress added
disclosure provisions to section 527 and required
most section 527 political organizations to disclose
their donors and expenditures.16 Independent ad-
vocacy organizations that wanted to avoid the
disclosure provisions in section 527 then sought to
organize under other code provisions, principally
as social welfare organizations or business leagues.
The main hurdle for political groups was that to
qualify for exempt status as a social welfare orga-
nization or a business league, their primary pur-
pose needed to be consistent with their exempt
purpose. It is this attempt to circumvent congres-
sional intent regarding political organizations’ dis-
closure of contributions and expenditures that
created most of the current regulatory mess.
Groups wishing to organize as social welfare
organizations instead of as political organizations
embraced several techniques to supposedly meet
participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of
or in opposition to any candidate for public office’’).
14See LTR 9808037 (‘‘It follows that any activities constituting
prohibited political intervention by a section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion are activities that must be less than the primary activities of
a section 501(c)(4) organization, which are, in turn, activities that
are exempt functions for a section 527 organization’’). See also
Elizabeth J. Kingsley, ‘‘Challenges to ‘Facts and Circumstances’
— a Standard Whose Time Has Passed?’’ 20 Tax. Exempt. 5, at
notes 7-9 (Mar./Apr. 2010). The IRS has indicated that in some
circumstances activities that would not be political intervention
in the section 501(c) context might be exempt function activity
for purposes of section 527 when the activity is closely tied to
election-related activities.
15See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. See also Rev. Rul.
2004-06 (listing other factors and examples).
16Section 527(j)(1), (j)(3)(A), (j)(3)(B) (requiring disclosure of
donors who contribute more than $200, and expenditures by the
organization exceeding $500).
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the social welfare purpose requirement.17 First, to
justify their exempt status, these new social welfare
organizations needed to engage in social welfare
activity. Political campaign activity would be insuf-
ficient. Some groups met this requirement by en-
gaging in genuine social welfare activities, like
lobbying or promoting issues. Others, however,
sought to meet this requirement by classifying
campaign-related activities as social welfare activi-
ties. Many of these groups appeared to take the
position that as long as the activity was not election-
related under Federal Election Commission rules, it
was a social welfare activity. That position is clearly
contrary to IRS rules and guidance.18 In fact, some
groups maintained that even communication re-
ported to the FEC was not campaign intervention
activity for purposes of determining social welfare
status.19
One particularly interesting method groups used
to ‘‘increase’’ social welfare spending was to make
donations to other social welfare groups. Groups
determined that those contributions were social
welfare because they were made to other social
welfare groups, often with the requirement that
they be spent on social welfare. The recipient group
then transferred the donation to another group,
which transferred it to yet another group. By trans-
ferring these funds and calling the transfers ‘‘social
welfare,’’ each group was able to claim that amount
as a social welfare expenditure. This churning of
money had a multiplier effect and improperly in-
creased the amount that each organization could
claim as social welfare.20 Once the groups could
claim a large amount of social welfare spending,
they had room to engage in significant political
campaign activity.
The second impediment facing groups seeking to
organize as social welfare organizations instead of
as section 527 political organizations was that it was
unclear how much social welfare activity was nec-
essary to satisfy the ‘‘primary’’ requirement in the
regulations. The IRS had never clarified what con-
stituted an organization’s primary purpose. In-
stead, it used a facts-and-circumstances analysis to
reach its conclusion. In many ways, the facts-and-
circumstances approach is preferable to a test that
uses a specific amount of social welfare activity. For
example, a rule that required that a majority of an
organization’s expenditures be for social welfare
would be problematic because an organization
could spend only a small amount of money but
have a huge volunteer contingent that engaged in a
tremendous amount of campaign advocacy. Fur-
ther, groups could use donations to other groups to
inflate their expenditures. A facts-and-
circumstances approach allows for an examination
of what is actually happening, not just what orga-
nizations assert is happening.
Bright-line tests have the advantage of being easy
to enforce, but in the campaign finance arena,
where game playing is extreme, bright-line tests can
often be problematic. Unfortunately, the facts-and-
circumstances approach has failed, and social wel-
fare groups have simply assumed they were
complying with the law as long as their expendi-
tures on social welfare exceeded 50 percent of their
overall expenditures. Groups therefore succeeded
in organizing as social welfare organizations, in-
stead of as political organizations, by characterizing
political campaign activity as social welfare educa-
tion and lobbying and by taking a broad view about
how much social welfare spending was required to
meet the primary purpose standard.
The proposed regulation is an attempt to crack
down on abuse in this area. Some claim that the
regulation is a restriction on the First Amendment,
but restrictions on massive political campaign ac-
tivity by social welfare organizations, labor unions,
and business leagues are not new.21 Groups have
been prohibited from engaging in significant politi-
cal campaign activity for over 50 years. The restric-
tions on political activity by exempt groups merely
define the scope of an organization’s activities.
Organizations can still engage in political campaign
activity. They just must do so in a way that provides
for disclosure of contributors, consistent with Con-
gress’s intent in enacting section 527. The IRS
should not allow groups to avoid disclosure by
masquerading as social welfare organizations. The
new proposed regulation is an attempt to address
this problem.
C. Proposed Regulation
The proposed regulation tackles some of the
existing problems by clearly indicating what types
of political activities will not count as social welfare
17Because the proposed regulation deals with social welfare
organizations, I have limited my analysis to those organizations.
The comments here would also apply to business leagues
organized under section 501(c)(6).
18See Rev. Rul. 2007-41; Rev. Rul. 2004-6 (‘‘when an advocacy
communication . . . does not explicitly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate, all the facts and circumstances need to be
considered to determine whether the expenditure is for an
exempt function’’).
19Kim Barker, ‘‘How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections
and Call It Public Welfare,’’ ProPublica (Aug. 18, 2012).
20Robert Maguire and Viveca Novak, ‘‘Shadow Money
Magic,’’ Center for Responsive Politics (Apr. 2013).
21Ellen P. Aprill, ‘‘Regulating the Political Speech of Non-
charitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United,’’ 10 Elect.
Law J. 363 (2011) (concluding the restriction on political inter-
vention is constitutional).
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activity and by limiting groups’ ability to use donor
social welfare organizations to inflate their social
welfare spending.22 The preamble invites comment
on whether the IRS should propose further regula-
tions defining the term ‘‘primarily,’’ what level of
activity should satisfy the primary purpose stan-
dard, and how to measure the activity. Comment is
also invited on whether the proposed regulation
should be applied to other tax-exempt entities.
1. Create new definition of candidate-related po-
litical activity. The proposed regulation takes a new
and creative approach to regulating intervention in
a political campaign. Because the definition of in-
tervention in a political campaign is inextricably
linked to various tax-exempt organizations, it is
difficult to create a bright-line standard that can be
applied to all of them. To address this in the past,
the IRS used a facts-and-circumstances test, which
allowed it to examine the underlying activity to
determine whether it was really intervention in a
political activity. Because tax-exempt churches and
charities are completely prohibited from interven-
ing in a political campaign, a broad bright-line test
might make it difficult for them to engage in some
activities that, while often partisan, can be con-
ducted in a nonpartisan manner.23 If the bright-line
test was going to apply to all tax-exempt organiza-
tions, the IRS might have to propose a more limited
test, which would allow further circumvention of
the current disclosure rules.
Instead, the proposed regulation creates a new
term, ‘‘candidate-related political activity,’’ which is
used for determining whether a particular activity
is consistent with the exempt organization’s pri-
mary purpose.24 If a social welfare organization
engages in candidate-related political activity, that
advocacy is not considered part of the organiza-
tion’s social welfare activity. By creating the concept
of candidate-related political activity, the proposed
regulation can implement a broader, bright-line
definition that would not have worked if it needed
to be applied to churches and charities.
Under the proposed regulation, a social welfare
organization must still be organized primarily for a
social welfare purpose, and candidate-related po-
litical activity is not considered a social welfare
purpose.
The regulation defines campaign-related political
advocacy to include:
1) Communication expressing a view on a
candidate that ‘‘contains words that expressly
advocate, such as ‘vote,’ ‘oppose,’ ‘support,’
‘elect,’ ‘defeat,’ or ‘reject’’’; or is susceptible to
no other reasonable interpretation; or
2) Public communication ‘‘within 30 days of
the primary or 60 days of the general election’’
that “refers to one or more clearly identified
candidates” or political parties in an election.
These two definitions are very similar to the
definitions for express advocacy and for election-
eering communication currently used to regulate
campaign activity under election laws. Both these
types of communications are generally subject to
disclosure and regulation by the Federal Election
Commission (FEC).
As a catchall, prop. reg. section 1.501(c)(4)-1 also
includes as campaign-related advocacy communi-
cations that are reported to the FEC. This catchall
addresses an ongoing problem whereby organiza-
tions claim that expenditures are campaign related
when filing with the FEC but, when filing with the
IRS, argue they are not intervening in a political
campaign.
Had the regulation stopped there, it would have
closely tracked election law rules and likely been
less controversial. It would also have been a signifi-
cant expansion of the existing rules regulating the
types of activities that social welfare organizations
can engage in and would have allowed for signifi-
cant gamesmanship regarding their activities. That
regulation would also have been completely incon-
sistent with the congressional purpose of requiring
section 527 political organizations to disclose con-
tributions and expenditures.
The proposed regulation includes two other pro-
visions that are designed to allow a bright-line rule
to police the divide between political activity and
social welfare activity. First, the regulation ad-
dresses quasi-campaign-related activity. These are
activities that often have a significant political pur-
pose but could arguably be non-campaign related.
The proposed regulation could have simply created
a bright-line rule allowing all those activities, but
since they are largely done by organizations wish-
ing to influence elections, a bright-line rule classi-
fying these activities as campaign-related is
appropriate.
For example, the proposed regulation classifies
as campaign-related: voter registration drives, get-
out-the-vote drives, distribution of material pre-
pared on behalf of the candidate, preparation or
22Donor social welfare organizations are social welfare orga-
nizations that donate to other social welfare organizations.
23For example, voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives
are often partisan activities done to support a candidate. A
nonpartisan voter registration drive designed to encourage
voter registration, or nonpartisan activity to help get people to
the polls to vote, are not considered intervention in a political
campaign and may be conducted by tax-exempt churches and
charities.
24Prop. reg. section 501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii).
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distribution of voter guides, and hosting or con-
ducting an event within 30 days of a primary
election or within 60 days of general election at
which one or more candidates appear.
These activities can easily be conducted in a
nonpartisan manner and not be an attempt to
intervene in a political campaign, but they are often
used by political campaign-related organizations
claiming a nonpartisan purpose when their actual
purpose is to influence an election. Under the
proposed regulation, if these activities are con-
ducted by a section 501(c)(3) organization in a
nonpartisan manner, they would be permitted be-
cause they would not be considered intervention in
a political campaign, but if a section 501(c)(4) social
welfare organization engaged in the same activities,
they would be considered candidate-related politi-
cal activities.
The bright-line determination including all this
activity as campaign-related troubles some com-
mentators. But that treatment makes sense in the
social welfare organization context. A church or
charity is completely prohibited from intervening in
a political campaign. This restrictive definition
would put the charitable status of those organiza-
tions at risk even if they were not engaging in
partisan campaign activity.
In the social welfare setting, however, the orga-
nization is allowed to engage in some amount of
campaign-related advocacy. The proposed regula-
tion would not prohibit a social welfare organiza-
tion from engaging in those activities; it would just
assert that they are not part of the group’s social
welfare purpose. If an organization engages in a
large amount of quasi-political activity, it can either
do so through a connected section 501(c)(3) organi-
zation if the activity is nonpartisan, or through a
section 527 political organization if the activity is
partisan.
Including this quasi-political activity as
candidate-related political activity, however, is im-
portant if we seek a regulation that recognizes
political realities. Over and over, the types of activi-
ties referenced by the proposed regulation have
been used by groups as integral parts of a strategy
to influence elections, while at the same time those
groups have argued their activity was not political.
In fact, social welfare organizations rarely engage in
these activities in a nonpartisan manner. If the social
welfare organization was engaged in a substantial
amount of nonpartisan activities listed in the regu-
lation, the group would organize as a section
501(c)(3) organization and receive the more favor-
able tax treatment. The proposed regulation tackles
the problem of quasi-political activity by recogniz-
ing political reality and classifying this activity as
campaign-related political activity.
For example, social welfare groups have held
political events designed to motivate ‘‘base’’ sup-
porters and have invited political candidates to
rallies and claimed that those activities were social
welfare educational activities.25 Groups have also
engaged in get-out-the-vote activities designed to
defeat a particular candidate and distributed litera-
ture on behalf of a candidate while claiming that the
activity was not political.26 These quasi-campaign-
related activities are difficult to police and are often
political activities masquerading as social welfare
or educational activities. The bright-line test in the
proposed regulation makes clear that these quasi-
campaign activities are treated as candidate-related
political activity for purposes of determining
whether an organization’s primary purpose is social
welfare.
Because social welfare organizations may engage
in some level of political campaign-related activity,
it is less troublesome that some of the advocacy
would traditionally not be considered intervention
in a political campaign. Those activities are simply
part of the allowed activities of social welfare
organizations that are not part of the organizations’
primary purpose. Because a social welfare organi-
zation is still allowed to engage in some of this
activity, the fact that it is not considered interven-
tion in a political campaign in the section 501(c)(3)
context is not problematic. In enacting section
501(c)(4), Congress used the term ‘‘exclusively’’ in
the statute. The current regulations expand on that
term, so a restrictive definition of campaign-related
activity is still consistent with congressional intent.
In fact, even this definition is broader than the
statutory language because it still allows some
amount of activities that are not social welfare
activities. If organizations want to engage in signifi-
cant nonpartisan activities that are classified as
campaign-related activities under the proposed
regulation, they can conduct those activities
through a connected section 501(c)(3) or section 527
organization.
The second major provision in the proposed
regulation that clarifies the rules for social welfare
organizations engaged in political advocacy deals
with donor section 501(c)(4) organizations. These
are social welfare organizations that make large
contributions to other social welfare organizations,
and in some instances, have no other purpose.
25Nicholas Confessore and Michael Luo, ‘‘Groups Targeted
by I.R.S. Tested Rules on Politics,’’ The New York Times, May 26,
2013, at A1.
26Id. (reporting that the Wetumpka Tea Party get-out-the-
vote drive was designed to defeat President Obama and that the
Ohio Liberty Coalition claimed the distribution of door hangers
for Romney was not political).
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These groups claim that those expenditures count
as social welfare spending in determining their
primary purpose. By transferring funds from one
social welfare organization to another, a group can
multiply its alleged social welfare spending without
engaging in social welfare. Moreover, by transfer-
ring from one organization to another, the donor is
able to put more layers between the original dona-
tion and the final expenditure. This potentially
allows donors even further opportunity to avoid
campaign finance disclosure. A recent study by the
Center for Responsive Politics and National Public
Radio traced the money flow of more than $17
million from one donor social welfare organization
to more than 15 organizations.27 Another recent
study by the Center for Responsive Politics and The
Washington Post traced more than $400 million in a
‘‘maze of money’’ that involved the transfer of
funds in a 17-entity network.28
The proposed regulation addresses this issue by
determining that a donation from one social welfare
organization to another is a campaign-related do-
nation unless the recipient organization provides a
statement that it engages in no campaign-related
activity. Nothing in this provision would stop a
donor from giving to a social welfare organization.
It would just stop an intermediate social welfare
organization from acting as a smoke screen for the
original donor or as a manipulator of money flows
to make it look like a social welfare organization is
engaged in a greater percentage of social welfare
activity.
The bright-line rule that the entire contribution
will be considered candidate-related political activ-
ity unless the recipient certifies that it spends no
money on campaign-related activity is strict, but it
has the significant benefit of seriously limiting
major abuse. A social welfare organization that
legitimately wants to contribute to another social
welfare organization that engages in some
campaign-related activity could still make the do-
nation. The only consequence under the proposed
regulation is that the spending would not count as
social welfare spending in determining the donor
organization’s primary purpose.
2. Primary purpose standard. Although the pro-
posed regulation does not address the primary
purpose standard, it does invite comment regarding
whether that standard should be revised, what
amount of activity should constitute primary pur-
pose, and how that amount should be calculated. If
the final regulation is going to usefully curtail
abusive activity, it must clarify the primary purpose
standard. Under the current vague standard,
groups (and, it appears, the IRS) have no clear
guidelines regarding what constitutes the primary
purpose of an organization.29 The vague standard,
especially in light of the IRS’s lack of enforcement,
allows groups to self-determine the amount of
social welfare activity that is sufficient to justify
exempt status. If the IRS cannot articulate a stan-
dard for organizations to follow, there is a signifi-
cant risk that the agency will once again find itself
accused of biased enforcement.
The IRS needs to clarify the amount of nonex-
empt activity that is allowed under the primary
purpose standard. In the church and charity con-
text, the IRS has provided guidance regarding the
primary purpose standard and through regulations
has indicated that to satisfy that standard an orga-
nization may engage in only an insubstantial
amount of nonexempt activity. Members of an
American Bar Association Section of Taxation task
force recommended that social welfare organiza-
tions be allowed to engage in nonexempt activity as
long as the nonexempt activity does not exceed 40
percent of their activity.30 At least at one point, the
IRS appeared to have been applying a 50 percent
standard for determining a group’s primary pur-
pose.31
The problem with a specific amount of activity
versus a facts-and-circumstances approach is that
money is not the only measure of an organization’s
primary purpose. For example, an organization
with thousands of volunteers handing out cam-
paign literature may have few campaign-related
expenditures, but its primary purpose will still
likely be campaign activity and not social welfare
activity.
At some point, clarity here is more important
than perfection. The IRS should set a clear guideline
27Novak et al., ‘‘Wellspring’s Flow: Dark Money Outfit
Helped Fuel Groups on Political Front Lines,’’ Center for
Responsive Politics (Nov. 5, 2013).
28Matea Gold, ‘‘Koch-Backed Political Coalition, Designed to
Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012,’’ The Washington
Post, Jan. 5, 2014.
29Commentators have suggested standards for primary pur-
pose that include everything from allowing a social welfare
organization to engage only in an insubstantial amount of
nonexempt activity to allowing an organization to engage in
49.9 percent of its activities for a nonexempt purpose.
30See ABA tax section, ‘‘Comments of the Individual Mem-
bers of the Exempt Organizations Committee’s Task Force on
Section 501(c)(4) and Politics,’’ at 9 (May 25, 2004).
31In a presentation on this issue, Marcus Owens, then-
director of the IRS’s Tax-Exempt and Government Entities
Division, said, ‘‘When it comes to political activities, that is,
giving money to a candidate, telling people to vote for a certain
candidate, the rule is that it has to be less than primary. If it’s 49
percent of their income, that is less than primary.’’ Owens,
‘‘Practicing Law Institute Program on Corporate Political Ac-
tivities,’’ Exempt Organization Tax Review, June 1990, at 471.
COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS
TAX NOTES, March 10, 2014 1127
(C) Tax Analysts 2014. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
of what constitutes the amount of nonexempt activ-
ity an organization may engage in and still qualify
for exempt status. One reason the IRS can justify an
expansive definition of campaign-related activity in
the proposed regulation is that organizations in-
volved in nonpartisan activity classified as
campaign-related activity still can maintain their
exempt status because they are allowed to engage
in a significant amount of campaign-related activity.
The proposed regulation is therefore hard to justify
if the threshold amount of nonexempt activity is too
low or if there is not another outlet for the activity.
The IRS should therefore either create a more lim-
ited definition of campaign-related activity or estab-
lish a level of permissible nonexempt activity that
allows social welfare organizations enough space to
operate in a reasonable way. The exact percent of
the ideal amount of allowable nonexempt activity is
debatable, but a number somewhere between 10
and 30 percent would avoid having organizations
unwillingly violate their exempt status by engaging
in quasi-political activity now classified as
campaign-related activity.
In addressing how to measure the amount of the
activity, the final regulation should adopt a bright-
line rule that is based on the expenditures of an
organization. Although this is a crude measure of
an organization’s activity and purpose, it is fairly
easy to measure and quantify. As long as the
amount of expenditures does not include
passthrough money used to increase the amount of
an organization’s social welfare spending, an ex-
penditure test will capture most of a group’s activi-
ties.
3. Organizations that fall through the cracks. One
problem with the new regulation and the new
standard for campaign-related activity for social
welfare organizations is that organizations engaged
in tax-exempt activities may find that there is no tax
exemption home in which they can organize. In
most cases, these organizations should be entitled
to exempt status. Absent some modification in the
regulation, hybrid groups would be engaged in
tax-exempt activity but would not qualify for ex-
empt status.
a. Hybrid organizations. For example, what hap-
pens to a group involved in education, lobbying,
and candidate-related advocacy? Suppose under
the proposed regulation the organization does not
engage in sufficient social welfare activity to be
characterized as a social welfare organization and
that it also does not engage in enough ‘‘influencing
an election’’ activity to qualify as a section 527
organization. All the hypothetical organization’s
activity is a type that would be tax-exempt, but the
organization would fail to qualify for exempt status
under any code provision. The IRS could treat the
organization as a taxable entity, but that conclusion
makes no sense and would require significant IRS
determinations regarding how to tax the organiza-
tion.
Because the main thrust here is to ensure that
groups are not circumventing congressional intent
regarding the disclosure provisions in section 527,
the proposed regulation should allow any organi-
zation engaged in candidate-related advocacy that
does not qualify as a social welfare organization to
organize as a section 527 organization and treat all
the candidate-related contributions to the organiza-
tion as tax-exempt contributions.32 Alternatively,
the IRS could propose that organizations be able to
create a segregated account for candidate-related
advocacy and traditional section 527 advocacy that
would not count as activity conducted by the social
welfare organization. The amounts in the segre-
gated account would be subject to the disclosure
provisions in section 527.33
b. Other tax-exempt organizations. The pro-
posed regulation invites comment regarding
whether it should apply to other tax-exempt orga-
nizations. The history in this area is clear. If the final
regulations do not apply similar requirements to all
section 501(c) organizations other than charities,
groups will simply reorganize under another code
provision. Groups are already contemplating using
section 501(c)(6) business leagues and section
501(c)(19) veterans organizations as a way to en-
gage in campaign-related activity, and section
501(c) contains many opportunities for organiza-
tions that could be used as an end run around the
regulation.
4. Don’t fight the last battle. Groups have consis-
tently sought organizational forms that allow them
to engage in anonymous campaign advocacy. Clari-
fication of the rules surrounding tax-exempt orga-
nizations and campaign advocacy may encourage
groups to seek out alternative entity classifications
as a means of avoiding restrictions created by the
new regulation. Absent further clarification of the
tax treatment of taxable entities involved in cam-
paigns, there is significant risk that groups will
forgo exempt status and instead organize as taxable
organizations. At the moment, it is unclear what the
tax ramifications would be to a taxable organization
involved in campaign advocacy. Without further
32Under current law, some of the contributions would not be
considered as for the purpose of influencing an election and
would be subject to tax under section 527.
33Social welfare organizations can already create a segre-
gated account to engage in section 527 exempt activity. The
regulations would need to create a broader account to include
campaign-related expenditures as well as expenditures de-
signed to influence an election.
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IRS clarification, taxable organizations may be the
next vehicle of choice to avoid campaign finance
disclosure, which may once again embroil the IRS in
unnecessary political decisions.34
Although any taxable campaign organization
would be subject to tax, the amount of taxable
income for a group might be small. Section 162(e)
prohibits an organization from deducting political
expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business
expense, so presumably a taxable organization
would have some tax liability if its primary purpose
was candidate-related political activity because it
could not deduct campaign-related expenditures.
However, if the group had little to no income, there
would be nothing to tax. Thus, if contributions to
the taxable organization were not considered in-
come, there would be few tax consequences to
using a taxable form as a campaign vehicle.
The IRS rulings in this area are old and are
ambiguous regarding whether contributions to a
taxable campaign organization are income. The IRS
should clarify that contributions to taxable organi-
zations for campaign advocacy are income to the
taxable entity and subject to tax. Alternatively, the
IRS should conclude that contributions are gifts and
thus subject to gift tax. It should also clarify that
taxable entities cannot circumvent this treatment by
claiming that payments to the taxable entity are
nontaxable contributions to capital.
Further, the IRS should clarify that the provisions
in section 527 apply to all organizations that have as
their primary purpose influencing elections, and
that section 527 status is not voluntary. The statute
is written in a way that makes section 527 status
mandatory for all entities that are primarily en-
gaged in influencing elections.35 If section 527 treat-
ment is mandatory, an organization could not
escape its disclosure requirements merely by claim-
ing to be a taxable organization.
D. Conclusion
The administration has taken a strong step for-
ward in proposing a regulation that will clarify the
permissible political campaign activities of tax-
exempt social welfare organizations. The regulation
is helpful in that it creates a bright-line rule that
would provide clear guidance to exempt organiza-
tions and also reduce the amount of discretion the
IRS would need to exercise in determining whether
a group is acting consistently with its exempt status.
By providing clearer rules, the proposed regulation
will also likely reduce the significant gamesman-
ship and violations of exempt status that have
occurred because Congress required disclosure by
section 527 groups.
Correctly implemented, broad-based bright-line
rules will not violate the First Amendment. As long
as there is a reasonable outlet for the communica-
tion in question, the proposed regulation would not
be a significant burden on speech. Organizations
can engage in unlimited political speech. If the
organization’s primary purpose is to engage in
election-related activity, it can organize as a section
527 political organization and disclose its donors
and expenditures. The proposed regulation is all
about basketing an organization into its correct
regulatory home — be that as a charity, social
welfare organization, business league, or political
organization.
Unfortunately, the proposed regulation is a fifth-
or sixth-best choice for dealing with the current
crisis. A better solution would be for Congress to
pass broad-based legislation requiring disclosure of
campaign-related activity and remove the IRS as a
campaign finance regulatory agency. The IRS serves
best when it is collecting revenue and protecting the
fisc, not when it is seen as a political tool of elected
officials, be they the Congress that funds it or the
administration that supervises it.36
34This article does not address all the difficult questions
raised by the use of taxable entities for political campaign
advocacy. For a more thorough discussion of this issue pre-
Citizens United, see Tobin, ‘‘Political Advocacy and Taxable
Entities: Are They the Next ‘Loophole’?’’ 6 First Amend. L. Rev.
41 (2007). Post-Citizens United, taxable corporations are an even
more attractive vehicle for campaign advocacy.
35See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, ‘‘A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on
Section 527 Organizations,’’ 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1773, 1784 (2007)
(‘‘Status as a political organization is not, as a technical matter,
elective’’).
36The second-best alternative would be for the FEC to
modify its current regulations and require disclosure of contri-
butions to social welfare organizations engaged in express
advocacy or electioneering communication unless the donor
specifically indicates that the contribution may not be used for
those purposes.
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